

Message Text

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43

ORIGIN DLOS-06

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EA-07 NEA-10 ISO-00 PCH-12 IO-13 AF-08

EUR-12 SIG-01 FEA-01 ACDA-07 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01

CEQ-01 CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 COME-00 DODE-00 DOTE-00

EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FMC-01 TRSE-00 H-02 INR-07

INT-05 JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 NSF-01 OES-06

OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SAL-01

OIC-02 /173 R

DRAFTED BY D/LOS:VRANDOLPH:JG

APPROVED BY D/LOS:RCBREWSTER

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R 232210Z SEP 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 236687

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PLOS

SUBJECT:EVALUATION OF GROUP AND COUNTRY ATTITUDES AT THE
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AUGUST-SEPTEMBER SESSION OF THE UN LOS CONFERENCE

BEGIN SUMMARY: ONE OF THE IMPORTANT FACTORS EMERGING FROM
THE RECENT LOS CONFERENCE IS THE REINFORCED SOLIDARITY OF

THE GROUP OF 77, MOST ESPECIALLY EVIDENT IN THE COMMITTEE I (SEABEDS) NEGOTIATIONS. FUTURE PROSPECTS ARE THAT THIS SOLIDARITY WILL CONTINUE, AND BE REINFORCED. IT WOULD THUS APPEAR THAT PRAGMATIC APPROACHES BY THE US TO RESOLVE LOS DIFFERENCES WILL INCREASINGLY BE MET BY IDEOLOGICAL RESPONSES FROM WHICH G-77 MEMBERS WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO DEVIATE. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING IS A REPORT BY THE LIAISON TEAM WITHIN THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE THIRD UN LOS CONFERENCE. THIS REPORT DIVIDES THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AS THEY TENDED TO LINE UP IN THE COURSE OF THE FIFTH SESSION DEBATE--THE DEVELOPED STATES VERSUS THE GROUP OF 77--AND ATTEMPTS TO ANALYZE THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO BROAD CATEGORIES. WHAT FOLLOWS REPRESENTS THE COLLECTIVE OPINION OF THE DELEGATION'S LIAISON TEAM, WHICH REPRESENTED THE DEPARTMENT'S FIVE REGIONAL BUREAUS. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS WITHIN THE G-77 IS BROKEN DOWN SEPARATELY AT THE END OF THE REPORT.

2. THE DEVELOPED STATES:

THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WERE GENERALLY PRESSED INTO GROUP TACTICS IN THE FACE OF THE G-77 EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SOLIDARITY ON CONFERENCE ISSUES. WHILE THE WEO GROUP MET ONLY ONCE, THE EUROPEANS COALESCED INTO TWO, OR THREE, MAJOR GROUPS: THE EC-9, THE NORDICS, AND

THE QTE SOCIALIST STATES UNQTE.

3. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES:

THE EC-9 CAME TO THIS SESSION FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH A FORMAL MANDATE TO SEEK ACCESSION TO AN LOS TREATY BY THE COMMUNITY AS AN INSTITUTION. THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE EC-9 OR MEMBER STATES ON MAJOR ISSUES GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE U.S. POSITIONS--NOTABLY THE ACCESS SYSTEM. ON OTHER ISSUES, INDIVIDUAL POSITIONS WERE MORE PROMINENT
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--THE FRENCH SUPPORT FOR AN QTE ANTI-MONOPOLY CLAUSE UNQTE IN DEEP SEABED MINING, THE SMALLER COUNTRIES' CONCERN FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS, AND THE IRISH CONCERN WITH THE CONTINENTAL SHELF MARGIN.

4. THE NORDIC STATES:

NORWAY, REPRESENTING THE NORDICS IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE, SOUGHT TO PLAY A MODERATING ROLE WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY HELPFUL IF THE CONFERENCE HAD CONCENTRATED ON COMPROMISE TEXTS RATHER THAN POSTURED DEBATE. THE NORDICS WERE REPEATEDLY CITED BY THE G-77 AS THE ONLY INDUSTRIALIZED GROUP OF STATES WHICH RECOGNIZED THE QTE COMMON

HERITAGE OF MANKIND UNQTE.

5. SOCIALIST STATES:

THE UNITY OF THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES (EXCEPT ROMANIA) WAS NEVER SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED. ON MOST OCCASIONS, THE SOVIET UNION SPOKE FOR THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. THE SOCIALIST STATES TOOK THE PREDICTABLE LINE THAT STATE ENTERPRISES SHOULD HAVE ACCESS TO DEEP SEA RESOURCES AND THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE ACCESS TO FISH FOUND IN OTHERS' ECONOMIC ZONES. COMMON CONCERN WITH THE MECHANISM FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REFLECTED SUSPICION OF COURTS AND TRIBUNALS. THE DESIRE OF THE SOCIALIST STATES FOR A TREATY OFTEN RESULTED IN TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR U.S. AND EUROPEAN POSITIONS.

6. THE GROUP OF 77:

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT CONCEPTS THAT HAS EMERGED FROM THE 5TH SESSION OF THE THIRD LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE IS THE REINFORCED SOLIDARITY OF THE GROUP OF 77. THIS

SOLIDARITY WAS MOST ESPECIALLY EVIDENT IN THE COMMITTEE I NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE G-77 CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BREAK RANKS WHENEVER THE POSITIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES ARE ON PUBLIC RECORD. THIS WAS MADE QUITE EVIDENT WITH THE INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS OF THE SO-CALLED SECRET BRAZIL GROUP TO TAKE ANY CONFIDENTIAL

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ACTION IN THE FACE OF THE REVOLT OF THE GROUP OF 77 AGAINST THE RSNT ON COMMITTEE I. THERE ARE WITHIN THE G-77 TOO MANY LEADERS FROM ALL GEOGRAPHIC AREAS SEEKING TO ASSUME THE MANTLE OF LEADERSHIP OF THE THIRD WORLD, AND THERE ARE TOO MANY INTERNAL OBJECTIVES AND EXTERNAL AMBITIONS TOO WELL SERVED BY G-77 SOLIDARITY TO EXPECT ANY OPEN SPLIT WITHIN THE LOS CONTEXTS.

OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST FEW YEARS, STARTING WITH THE 6TH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1974, THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE G-77 HAS BUILT A BODY OF DOGMA, EMBODIED IN THE CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES (CERDS), THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (NIEO), AND THE LIMA PLAN OF ACTION FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION, APPROVED BY INDIVIDUAL STATES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND WHICH, THEREFORE, HAS COME TO SERVE INCREASINGLY AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR G-77 MEMBER STATES' ACTION IN ALL FORA, INCLUDING THE LOS CONFERENCE. THE RESULT HAS BEEN AN INCREASING COALESCENCE OF THE G-77 IN THE LOS CONTEXT, WHICH WAS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN THE COMMITTEE I NEGOTIATIONS. THE FUTURE PROSPECTS ARE THAT SUCH COALESCENCE WILL CONTINUE, AND BE REINFORCED.

TO THIS END, THE G-77 IS CURRENTLY HOLDING IN MEXICO CITY A MINISTERIAL-LEVEL CONFERENCE AIMED, INTER ALIA, AT FORMALIZING THE STRUCTURE OF THE G-77. ONE OF THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOMES OF THE MEXICO MEETING WILL BE ENDORSEMENT OF THE CALL OF PRESIDENT BHUTTO OF PAKISTAN FOR A SUMMIT-LEVEL G-77 CONFERENCE NEXT YEAR TO PUT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE-LEVEL IMPRIMATUR ON G-77 MINISTERIAL-LEVEL DECISIONS. IT WOULD SEEM THAT -LE MANY US POSITIONS ARE PREDICATED ON THE POSSIBLE BREAK-UP OF G-77 SOLIDARITY, THE G-77 LEADERSHIP IS VIGOROUSLY ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THE G-77 AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL TO AVOID ANY LOSS OF SOLIDARITY SO AS TO PRECLUDE AN INDIVIDUAL MEMBER'S SEEKING ITS OWN BEST INTEREST SEPARATELY IN THE LOS AND MANY OTHER POLITICO-ECONOMIC FORA.

THUS IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE PRAGMATIC APPROACHES OF THE UNITED STATES, SUCH AS THOSE EMBODIED IN THE OFFERS MADE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER DURING HIS VISITS TO THE LOS
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CONFERNECE, WILL INCREASINGLY BE MET BY IDEOLOGICAL RESPONSES ON THE RECORD FROM WHICH FEW, IF ANY, INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE G-77 CAN BE EXPECTED TO DEVIATE.

7. LATIN AMERICAN ATTITUDES:

THE LATINS HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN LEADING ADVOCATES OF THE G-77 CONCEPT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY IN PURSUIT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER; THEY REGARD THAT CONCEPT AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN AN LOS TREATY. THE LATIN TERRITORIALISTS, AND THEY NOW COMPRISE MOST OF THE IMPORTANT, NON-CARIBBEAN STATES, ALREADY HAVE WHAT THEY WANT IN THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE AND THE 12-MILE TERRITORIAL SEA. FAR FROM BEING APPALLED BY THE PROSPECT OF U.S. 200-MILE UNILATERAL ACTION, THEY APPLAUD AND WELCOME IT AS LEGITIMIZING WHAT HAS COME TO BE KNOWN AS THE LATIN CONTRIBUTION TO CUSTOMARY LOS. IT ALSO SHOWS THE G-77 THE LATINS WERE RIGHT.

THE ECONOMICALLY POWERFUL LATIN AMERICAN STATES, AMONG THE MOST SOPHISTICATED OF THE G-77, ARE LIKEWISE NOT FRIGHTENED BY THE IDEA OF DEEP SEABED MINING WITHOUT AN LOS TREATY. MANY OF THEM UNDERSTAND THAT THE TECHNOLOGY TO CARRY IT OUT WILL BE PURCHASABLE, AND COUNTRIES LIKE VENEZUELA AND BRAZIL, ACCUSTOMED TO DEALING WITH THE MULTINATIONALS AND UNAFRAID OF THEM, WILL PLAN TO BUY IN WHEN THE TIME COMES. THE WEAK LATIN STATES WHICH DO FEAR THE INDUSTRIALIZED STATES AND THE MULTINATIONALS CANNOT, PARADOXICALLY, SUPPORT A TREATY EITHER, BECAUSE THEY ARE AFRAID OF BEING BESTED

IN NEGOTIATIONS AS THEY HAVE SO OFTEN BEEN IN BILATERAL AND CONTRACT DEALINGS. THUS ECUADOR, IN DEEP ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TROUBLE AT HOME AND FUEDING WITH THE OIL COMPANIES, WOULD RATHER FULMINATE AGAINST US THAN NEGOTIATE.

THE STATES OF LATIN AMERICA ARE CONCERNED ABOUT UNILATERAL ACTIONS WHICH WOULD DENY THEM FISHING ZONES, AND COULD BE PERSUADED TO NEGOTIATION THEREBY. HOWEVER, EVEN THAT INCENTIVE WOULD NOT IN ITSELF CAUSE THEM TO CONFIDENTIAL

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SUPPORT THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES ON OTHER LOS ISSUES. THE CENTRAL AMERICANS AND SOME CARIBBEANS, USED TO CLIENT STATUS, WOULD SUPPORT US PRIVATELY, BUT THEY WOULD REALLY PREFER A REGIONAL PROGRAM SUITABLE TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS.

BUT THE LIAISON TEAM BELIEVES THAT ALMOST NO LATIN STATE WILL GO PUBLICLY, ON RECORD, AGAINST THE G-77.

8. AFRICAN ATTITUDES:

THE AFRICAN PROFILE SEEMED SOMEWHAT LOWER THAN AT THE PREVIOUS SESSIONS. NONETHELESS, THE MORE RADICAL ACTIVISTS IN THE G-77 SUCH AS TANZANIA, GHANA AND SOMALIA CONTINUED TO MAKE THEIR PRESENCE FELT. KENYA AND NIGERIA PRESSED HARD FOR POSITIONS WE OPPOSE, BUT DID SO MORE FOR PRAGMATIC RATHER THAN IDEOLOGICAL REASONS. THE AFRICAN COASTAL STATES ARE FIRM IN THEIR VIEW THAT THE EEZ SHOULD BE SUI GENERIS OR AN AREA OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION AND THAT MARINE RESEARCH SHOULD REQUIRE CONSENT. THEY FOLLOW THE RADICAL G-77 LEADERSHIP ON THE DEEP SEABEDS ISSUE, AND A NUMBER ARE NOW CONVINCED THAT THE SEABEDS HOLD OUT MORE HOPE FOR REWARDS THAN AFRICA'S RELATIVELY SMALL CONTINENTAL SHELF. THE LANDLOCKED-COASTAL STATE CONTROVERSY CAUSED MUCH HARD FEELING WITHIN THE AFRICAN CAUCUS AND THE OAU MANDATE TO DEVELOP A REGIONAL SHARING OF EEZ RESOURCES FOUNDERED BADLY. LASTLY, THE LARGE BLOC OF VOTES--43 IN ALL--THAT BLACK AFRICA REPRESENTS IS PROBABLY SOFTER ON MOST ISSUES THAN ANY OTHER REGION, AND FUTURE U.S. STRATEGY SHOULD TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

9. ARAB AND INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT ATTITUDES:

WHILE THE ARAB GROUP HAS EMERGED FROM THE CONFERENCE AS A REASONABLY UNITED COALITION OF HARD-LINERS, THEIR UNITY IS NOT NECESSARILY BASED ON ANY UNIFIED VIEW OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL LOS OBJECTIVES BUT RATHER ON OTHER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS. THE PETROLEUM

PRODUCERS MUST MAINTAIN A DOMINANT ROLE IN THE THIRD
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WORLD IN ORDER TO DEFLECT THE ADVERSE REACTION BY ITS
OTHER MEMBERS TO INCREASING PETROLEUM PRICES, WHICH
SERIOUSLY HURTS MOST OF THE LDCS. THE NON-PETROLEUM
PRODUCERS AMONG THE ARABS HAVE BECOME STRONGLY, IF NOT
VITALLY, DEPENDENT ON THE LARGESSE OF THE PRODUCERS
TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC VIABILITY. THUS, WHILE EGYPT, FOR
EXAMPLE, PRIVATELY WILL MOUTH SUPPORT FOR THE PARALLEL
SYSTEM OF SEABED EXPLOITATION, IT IS NOT LIKELY TO DO SO
IN ANY PUBLIC FORUM.

TO A LESSER EXTENT, THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF THE INDIAN
SUB-CONTINENT STATES, WHICH ARE HARD-PRESSED TO MAINTAIN
THEIR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS WHILE PAYING HIGH PETROLEUM
PRICES AND WHICH DREAD FURTHER PRICE INCREASES.
THE SUB-CONTINENT STATES ARE ALSO EMBROILED IN EFFORTS
TO KEEP OR WIN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS WITHIN THE NON-
ALIGNED AND THE G-77. INDIA'S HARD-LINE POSITION,
ESPECIALLY IN THE COMMITTEE I NEGOTIATIONS, REFLECTED
THAT COUNTRY'S DESIRE TO EXERT LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE
G-77. THUS THEIR ACTIONS WITHIN THE LOS CONTEXT FRE-
QUENTLY ARE MORE DIRECTED TOWARDS THAT OBJECTIVE THAN
RESOLUTION OF THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS BEFORE THE
CONFERENCE.

10. EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC ATTITUDES:

THE G-77 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VIEWS ARE A PRE-
DOMINANT INFLUENCE AMONG THE ASIAN STATES AT THE LOS
CONFERENCE. COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE PHILIPPINES AND
INDONESIA WANT A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT AND THE G-77 AND THEREFORE SEE IT AS IN THEIR
INTEREST TO BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THESE GROUPS.
STATES WHICH CAN BE CONSIDERED QTE MODERATE UNQTE, SUCH
AS MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE AND OTHERS, CANNOT AT THIS TIME
SPEAK OUT WITH ANY REAL EXPECTATION OF SUCCESS IN
RALLYING OTHERS TO SUPPORT VIEWS OPPOSING TRENDS IN THE
G-77. EVEN SUCH MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AS AUSTRALIA,
NEW ZEALAND AND JAPAN, IN PARTICULAR, OFTEN HAVE STRONG
POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC REASONS FOR NOT FLYING IN
THE FACE OF G-77 PROPOSALS. THE G-77 REPRESENTS FOR
MANY OF THE POORER ASIAN STATES THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE
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EQUALITY OF NEGOTIATING POWER VIS-A-VIS THE DEVELOPED
WORLD. FOR THIS GOAL THEY ARE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH
SOME OF THE MORE QTE RADICAL UNQTE STANDS. AND PERHAPS
FOR SOME OF THE ASIANS THE LOS TREATY IS A MUCH

LESS IMPORTANT NATIONAL GOAL THAN MORE PRESSING ECONOMIC ISSUES.

ANOTHER FACTOR INFLUENCING ASIANS IN THE LOS CONTE-
EXT IS THE IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL POLARIZATION BETWEEN
CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST SYSTEMS ENCOURAGED BY SUCH
COUNTRIES SUCH AS CHINA AND NORTH KOREA AND SUPPORTED
BY VIETNAM, LAOS, CAMBODIA AND OTHERS. THE COMMUNIST
STATES MERGE THIS APPROACH AND TRY TO BLEND IT INTO
POPULAR G-77 THEMES, SUCH AS THE NIEO. FURTHER, MANY
ASIAN STATES ARE NOT YET CONVINCED THAT THEIR POSITIONS
ON SUCH ISSUES AS STRAITS, ARCHIPELAGOES, FISHING
AND OTHERS ARE REALLY SUSCEPTIBLE AT THIS TIME TO
ACCOMMODATION THAT WOULD PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS.

SUCCESS IN WINNING OVER SOME OF THE ASIAN STATES MORE
TOWARD OUR LOS POSITIONS WILL REQUIRE DILIGENT BI-
LATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PERSISTENCE COUPLED WITH A
REDUCTION IN THE CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH OF MEMBERS
OF THE G-77. ROBINSON

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 16 SEP 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LAW OF THE SEA, LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, POLICIES, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 SEP 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE236687
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: D/LOS:VRANDOLPH:JG
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D760361-0670
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t197609108/baaaeqfl.tel
Line Count: 349
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN DLOS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <04 MAY 2004 by buchant0>; APPROVED <25 AUG 2004 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: OF GROUP AND COUNTRY ATTITUDES AT THE
TAGS: PLOS
To: ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
BAGHDAD BY POUCH
BEIRUT BY POUCH
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PORT MORESBY
SUVA
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Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006